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REPORTING GAIN ON SCINS AFTER DEATH
— by Neil E. Harl*
 A major concern from the beginning with self cancelling
installment notes (SCINs) has been the treatment of the gain
in the obligation cancelled at the death of the seller.1  The
recent decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Estate of Frane2  has provided additional guidance on
whether and when the gain is reported into income.
Consequences of using SCIN's
For many taxpayers desiring to dispose of property by
sale or other taxable exchange, the installment contract,
private annuity and self-cancelling installment note are
viewed as alternatives to be considered in making a decision
on how to structure the transaction.3  However, the three
concepts have vastly different tax consequences.
For installment contracts, the cancellation or forgiveness
of principal payments is reportable as gain whether
cancelled before or after the death of the seller.4  The
outcome is the same as a disposition of the obligation except
that cancellation or forgiveness may involve less than the
entire amount of gain in the obligation.  The gain is
calculated using fair market of the obligation but if the
parties are related the fair market value of the obligation is
not less than the face amount.5   IRS has ruled that
cancellation of principal in a debt restructuring involving an
installment sales contract does not result in income tax
consequences to the seller if to help a financially troubled
buyer.6
For transactions respected as private annuities, payments
normally continue until the death of the annuitant7 and there
is no gain to the annuitant or annuitant's estate in the event
of premature death.8
A self-cancelling installment note is a debt obligation
which is extinguished at the death of the seller with the
remaining note balance cancelled automatically by the terms
of the note.9  However, with a SCIN the deferred gain is
recognized by the decedent's estate on the estate's first
income tax return.10  The Tax Court in Estate of Frane had
held that the payments cancelled at death under a SCIN were
reportable as gain on the decedent's final income tax
return.11
________________________________________________
*
 Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; member of the
Iowa Bar.
Effects of Frane
Whether the gain is reported on the decedent's final
return or the estate's first income tax return has important
implications for planning.
•  Income tax from the decedent's final return is
deductible for federal estate tax purposes.12  Amounts
reported in the estate's income tax return are not
deductible.13
•  If the gain reported on the estate's income tax return is
actually taxed on the estate's return, the tax rate may be
substantially higher than if included on the decedent's final
return.14  The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 increased
sharply the tax liability of trusts and estates effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1992.15  The
rates for trusts and estates are now as follows —
Up to $1500 15%
1500-3500 28%
3500-5500 31%
5500-7500 36%
Over 7500 39.6%
•  Depending upon the will or state law, the tax burden in
terms of who ultimately pays the tax may be different
depending upon whether paid on the decedent's final return,
the estate's first income tax return or the beneficiary’s
returns.
FOOTNOTES
1 See GCM, 39503, May 7, 1986; Rev. Rul. 86-72, 1986-1
C.B. 253.  See also N. Harl, "Cautionary Note on
SCIN's," 3 Agric. L. Dig. 129 (1992); N. Harl,
Agricultural Law § 48.03[3][d] (1993).
2 93-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,386 (8th Cir. 1993), aff'g and rev'g,
98 T.C. 341 (1992).
3 See N. Harl, Agricultural Law § 48.03 (installment
contract), ch. 49 (private annuity); § 48.03[3][d] (SCIN)
(1993).
4 I.R.C. § 453B(f).
5 I.R.C. § 453B(f)(2).
6 Ltr. Rul. 8739045, June 30, 1987 (no recognition,
however, of the enactment of I.R.C. § 453B(f) in 1980.
7 See Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
8 Id.
9 See n. 1 supra.
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*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
10 Est. of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992), aff'd and
rev'd, 93-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 50,386 (8th Cir. 1993).
11 98 T.C. 341 (1992) (cancellation of installment note
treated as disposition; reported on decedent's final
return).
12 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(f).
13 Id.
14 I.R.C. § 1(e).
15 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13201(c), Pub. L.
103-66, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
COWS-ALM § 1.01[2].* The plaintiff was injured when
the plaintiff’s truck struck several cows on a highway. The
cows belonged to the defendants and had escaped from
separate fenced pastures. The defendants had both moved
for a directed verdict in the trial but the court allowed the
case to go to the jury which awarded damages to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff had presented evidence of prior
escapes by the cows of both defendants and the poor
condition of the fences. The plaintiff also provided expert
testimony that the fences were inadequate because the
fences allowed the cows to stick their heads through the
fences, which encouraged the cows to attempt to break
through the fences. The appellate court held that the
evidence was sufficient to raise factual issues of the
defendants’ negligence to allow the case to go to the jury.
Carver v. Kinnett, 434 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. App. 1993).
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[2].* The plaintiff was injured
when the plaintiff’s car struck a horse owned by the
defendants. The plaintiff sued the defendants for
negligently, willfully and wantonly allowing the horse to
run at large on a highway. The trial court granted the
defendant summary judgment. The appellate court reversed
holding that Ala. Code § 3-5-14(a) (making it unlawful for
persons having custody of livestock to allow the livestock to
run at large in the police jurisdiction of a city) created a
duty in the defendant not to negligently allow the horse to
run at large and that the plaintiff had presented sufficient
evidence of prior escapes by the horse to raise a fact issue
as to whether the defendant was negligent in fencing the
horse. The court noted that the degree of care required is
dependent upon the animal involved and the nearness of the
enclosure to public highways. Lollar v. Poe, 622 So.2d 902
(Ala. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS-ALM § 13.03[3].*  The
debtor was a cotton merchant who stored cotton in the
creditor’s warehouse. The creditor’s billing procedure was
to invoice the cotton owners for storage and shipping costs
when the cotton was removed from the warehouse. The
invoices stated that payment was due in seven days but the
creditor presented evidence in the industry and between the
creditor and debtor that late payments of nine to 19 days
were ordinarily allowed before more stringent payment
terms were imposed. The trustee had sought recovery of
payments made by the debtor to the creditor within 90 days
prior to the petition as preferential. The creditor claimed
that the payments were eligible for the Section 547(b)(2)(C)
exception for payments made in the ordinary course of
business. The trustee had argued that the most extreme
incidents of late payments in the pre-preferential period
should be excluded from consideration but that the most
extreme incidents of late payments during the preferential
period were not in the ordinary course of business. The
court held that the entire history of payments between the
creditor and the debtor and the creditor and the other clients
was relevant to the issue and the history demonstrated that
the late payments made by the debtor were within the
ordinary course of business practiced by the creditor to all
clients; therefore, the late payments made during the 90
days before the petition were not preferential. In re Julien
Co., 157 B.R. 834 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
AMENDMENT. The debtors originally filed for Chapter
11 and claimed the federal homestead exemption to the
extent of the debtors’ equity in the house. The case was
converted to Chapter 7 and the debtors amended the
exemption to claim the exemption under the Washington
homestead exemption. During this time, the home increased
in value by almost $80,000. The trustee objected to the
amendment as in bad faith and prejudicial to creditors. The
court held that the amendment would be allowed because
the initial exemption claimed prevented the sale of the
house and all appreciation in the house belonged to the
debtors. In re Hall, 1 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption and sought to avoid judicial liens which
impaired the exemption. The court held that under Illinois
law, judicial liens cannot attach to the debtor’s exemption
amount; therefore, the judicial liens could not impair the
debtor’s homestead exemption rights. In re Haynes, 157
B.R. 646 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1992).
CONVERSION OF ASSETS. One month prior to filing
for bankruptcy, the debtor consulted with an attorney and
converted non-exempt property into an exempt annuity. The
trustee objected to the annuity exemption as improper pre-
bankruptcy planning. The court held that because no
evidence was presented that the conversion occurred under
imminent threat of levy, attachment, garnishment or
execution, the conversion was not improper. In re Swecker,
157 B.R. 694 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
CONVERSION OF CASE. The debtor had filed a
Chapter 13 case in which the plan was confirmed.  The
debtor had claimed, as exempt, interests in two IRA's.  The
debtor converted the case to Chapter 7 and the trustee
